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Abstract. Cash and its use will connect to many things, such as the performance of corporate 
governance. This empirical research examines the interaction effect of insider ownership, 
institutional ownership, and independent board toward the influence of cash policy on 
the firm value. This research using agency theory framework, corporate governance using 
Indonesia listed firms’ samples over 2001-2017 (197 firms, 3349 observation). Fixed effect 
dynamic panel regression and regression-moderated analysis used in this research. We show 
that these results suggest that the insider ownership, institutional ownership, and independent 
board strengthen the influence of the corporate cash policy on firm’s value. It develops the 
previous research findings in Indonesia, especially in the implication of cash management 
from the perspective of agency theory and corporate governance.
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Abstrak. Kas dan penggunaannya akan dikaitkan dengan banyak hal, termasuk kinerja tata 
kelola organisasi. Dalam konteks ini, struktur kepemilikan memiliki fungsi monitoring. Riset 
empiris menguji peran kepemilikan internal, kepemilikan institusi, dan dewan independen 
terhadap pengaruh kebijakan kas pada nilai perusahaan. Riset berdasar teori keagenan dan 
tata kelola perusahaan di Indonesia dengan sampel 197 perusahaan atau 3349 observasi, 
selama tahun 2001-2017. Riset menggunakan alat analisis regresi panel dinamis efek tetap 
dan regresi berjenjang. Penelitian ini secara umum mengindikasikan bahwa kepemilikan 
internal, kepemilikan institusi, dan dewan independen memperkuat pengaruh manajemen 
kas pada nilai perusahaan. Penelitian ini mengembangkan temuan di Indonesia khususnya 
manajemen kas dilihat dari teori keagenan dan tata kelola perusahaan.
Kata Kunci: kebijakan kas, kepemilikan internal, kepemilikan institusi, dewan independen
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Introduction
Research on cash management has developed rapidly. Cash management is a critical 
decision. The optimal cash, the speed of optimal cash adjustment is significant for companies, 
especially in developing countries (Da Cruz, 2015; Chang et al., 2016). The average cash in 
Indonesia is 5.8% - 7%, Singapore is 14% -20%, Philippines are 14% - 32%, Malaysia is 
7% - 17%, and Thailand is 8% - 14% (Da Cruz, 2015). The company’s cash will be lower in 
countries with weak legal protection, high insider control (Pinkowitz et al., 2006; Anderson 
& Hamadi, 2016; Duran et al., 2016). From various management perspectives, cash reflects 
the decision of the manager that influence by the structure of company ownership (Shipe, 
2015; Duran et al., 2016).
In various perspectives, empirical studies, cash management, and the amount of cash 
reflect the manager’s decision (Jiang & Lie, 2016; Duran et al., 2016; Anderson & Hamadi, 
2016). Effective and efficient corporate governance can handle agency problems occurred 
by the excess cash. Weak corporate governance has the potential for excess cash to allocate 
in the interest outside the effort for increasing the firm value. The level of concentration 
of ownership in a company will determine the distribution of power between shareholders 
and managers (Duran et al., 2016; Lozano & Duran, 2016). The empirical evidence of 
the influence of managerial ownership on the firm value shows different results (Huegen 
et al., 2009; Duran et al., 2016). Some researches show that institutional ownership has 
a negative influence on firm value, while other research gives a positive influence on firm 
value (Johnsen & Milton, 2003; Lozano & Duran, 2016). Some researches show that 
there is a positive influence between institutional ownership and firm value. Through 
optimal monitoring, the independent commissioner can reduce excessive risk and hazard 
moral behavior made by the non-independent commissioner (Coles et al., 2001; Lozano 
& Duran, 2016).
Various studies on cash holding firms develope from capital structure theories: trade-
off theory, agency theory, pecking order theory, and market timing to explain corporate 
liquidity (Dittmar & Duchin, 2011). In the development of the literature on cash holding, 
the usage of the cash holding speed of adjustment methodology is the same approach as in 
testing trade-off theories in the capital structure literature (Byoun, 2008). Shipe (2015) study 
found that the speed of adjustment as measured from cash volatility cash holding indicated 
an increase in firm value measured by Tobin’s Q. The results of the study also showed a 
significant positive relationship between cash holding speed of adjustment and firm value.
Several studies have found that in firms with weak corporate governance, they spend 
their cash holdings faster for inefficient investments. Weak corporate governance causes 
inefficient investments. It will give consequences on the profitability of the firm, as well as 
the value of the firm. Coles et al. (2001) argue that larger councils provide more excellent 
monitoring, thus improving firm performance. Lozano & Duran (2016) found a significant 
relationship between insider ownership and firm performance. Another study conducted by 
Stulz (1988) found that in a situation where insider ownership is low, there would be an 
increase in firm value because the right to supervise will be more formal.
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Dittmar & Duchin’s research (2011) found that adjustment cost has a vital role in the 
adjustment cash holding. The investigation conducted by Dittmar & Duchin (2011) found 
various factors that play a role in adjusting cash holding: access to banks, the size of free cash 
flow, and the quality of corporate governance. The research by Dittmar & Mahrt-Smith (2007), 
Jiang & Lie (2015) found evidence that holding firms or managerial entrenchment will reduce 
excess cash or cash speed of adjustment faster than firms’ growth. Corporate governance has a 
weak role in monitoring the use and management of the firm’s cash that has grown.
Institutional ownership is part of the firm’s shares owned by institutional investors, 
such as insurance firms, financial institutions (banks, financial firms, and credit), pension 
funds, investment banking, and other firms related to these categories. Institutional investors 
are more interested in the high cash holding because of the positive impact on the value 
and performance of the firm (Ferreira & Matos, 2008). Institutional investors will prefer 
and appreciate appropriate business decisions and long-term investments, continuous 
monitoring, and management improvements (Gillan & Starcks, 2003; Lozano & Duran, 
2016). Kusnadi (2005) finds that government ownership is prevalent in Singapore companies. 
The companies with controlling institutional ownership tend to perform better than those 
with no controlling shareholder. Institutional investors will reduce opportunistic problems 
and agency costs and provide support for external financing and cash holding allocations on 
projects with positive NPV.
Jensen & Meckling (1976) also argue that smaller council size can improve 
communication, cohesiveness, and coordination to make the monitoring more effective. 
Through optimal supervision, independent commissioners can reduce excessive risk-taking 
and moral hazard behavior taken by non-independent commissioners (Coles et al., 2001). The 
higher representation of independent commissioners will improve the function of strategic 
control from the commissioners. In cash management literature, it reveals that managers 
must actively manage cash to smooth the firm’s operational activities and increase firm value 
(Shipe, 2015). The independent board is expected to be able to take on the responsibility 
to monitor the management team so that they work effectively in increasing shareholder 
prosperity (Shipe, 2015).
The purpose and motivation of the study are to test its importance owner structure 
to monitoring and control of cash, optimal cash holding for firms as well as the importance 
of speed holding cash adjustment for the firms in increasing their firm value. Given their 
ownership structure, family owners can use different mechanisms to increase their control 
cash holding over the firm and extract private benefits from minority shareholders. Firms in 
Indonesia have low cash fluctuation; weak protection shareholders are volatile and included 
in transitioning countries (Da Cruz, 2015). 
Method
The present research employed data from non-financial firms listed on the Indonesia 
Stock Exchange in 2001-2017, used 197 firms or 3449 observations from various sources, 
including Indonesian Capital Market Directory (ICMD), Bloomberg database (BNI Corner) 
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and Osiris database. The determination of samples uses purposive sampling method. The 
dependent variable in this research is the firm value measured from Tobin’s Q. Tobin’s Q 
is (market value of all standing shares + debt)/total assets. The independent variables in 
this research were cash (C_TA), the optimal cash holding (and cash holding the speed 
of adjustment. Moderating variables in this research were managerial ownership (%), 
institutional ownership (%), and independent commissioners (%).
The basic model for the estimation of the determination of optimal cash holding used 
the optimal cash model from Orlova & Rao (2018):
Cash Holding = α0 + β1 MTBi,t + β2 Sales Growthi,t + β3 Sizei,t + β5 NWCi,t + β6 CapExpi,t 
  + β7 Levi,t + β8 Divi,t + β9 Agei,t + β10 Industrii,t + εi,t
Where the cash variable is cash & cash equivalent/ total assets; MTB is the market value 
of equity/total assets; Sales Growth is salest0 - salest-1 / salest0; Size is the natural log of total 
assets; NWC is the net working capital/total assets, capital expenditure is capital expenditure/ 
total assets; leverage is total debt/total assets. Dividend is a dummy 1 for those paying for 
dividends. Dummy 0 is for those who do not pay dividends, while age is the natural log of 
firm age, industry is a dummy variable.
The determination of the standard partial adjustment cash holding model used the 
Dittmar & Duchin (2011) model of Orlova & Rao (2018). The standard partial adjustment 
cash holding model is used to partially distinguish the cash holding speed of adjustments, 
which is between firms or industries. The coefficient β is a cash holding speed of adjustment. 
The higher β coefficient shows the faster the cash holding speed of adjustment.
Standard partial adjustment cash holding model: 
Cashi,t+1 – Cashi,t = β (Cash*i,t+1 – Cashi,t) + e
Where variable cashi,t+1 is the cash holding when t+1, cashi,t is the cash holding when t, cash*i,t+1 
is the optimal cash holding or target cash holding, β is cash holding speed of adjustment 
towards target and e is the error term. 
Cash and cash* are scaled by total asset. Often the optimal or target level of cash 
holdings can be estimated as:
Cash*i = β Xi + FEi
Where X1 is a vector of observable firm specific that determine the firms target level of cash 
holding, β is a vector of coefficients and FEi is the firm fixed effect.
The econometric method uncertainties arising from dynamic panel data have made 
it easy to achieve consensus on the speed of adjustment. Data have heterogeneity firms and 
long-time observation. The estimator of dynamic panel data has two essential advantages: 
controlling for potential endogeneity problems and addressing the dynamic nature of cash 
holding (Chang et al., 2015).
Result and Discussion
Table 1 shows that cash & cash equivalent/total assets in the sample firms have an 
average of 0.0889, which means that the average cash of the firm is 8.89% of the total assets. 
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MTB_TA or the market value of total equity assets that are indicators that the firm’s market 
value has an average of 0.8115, it means that the average market value of the firm is lower 
than the book value. The optimal cash average in Indonesia is quite low compared to Da 
Cruz (2015) findings in Southeast Asian countries. The estimated speed of adjustment to 
optimal cash is 9.888%. The findings indicate that the speed of adjustment to optimal cash in 
Indonesia is quite low when compared to other countries, such as China, Belgium that ranges 
from 20% to 40% (Chang et al., 2015; Jiang & Lie, 2015; Anderson & Hamadi, 2016).
Table 1. Descriptive Statistics
Mean Maximum Minimum Std. Dev
C_TA 0.0889 0.7235 0.0059 0.0969
MTB_TA 0.6115 2.1689 0.0042 0.5403
Sales 0.0229 2.1663 0.0082 0.9150
Size 6.0824 8.4707 2.7533 0.7625
NWC_TA 0.4103 0.8076 0.0029 0.3062
CE_TA 0.0487 0.7844 0.0000 0.0622
Debt_TA 0.2924 0.6634 0.0004 0.2055
DIV 0.4580 1.0000 0.0000 0.4983
LogAge 6.0824 6.0031 2.7533 0.7625
Optimal Cash 0.0572 0.8130 0.0010 0.0207
Speed Adj 0.0988 0.8534 0.0092 0.1485
Independent Board 0.3593 0.4541 0.0000 0.1526
Insider Ownership 0.0251 0.5845 0.0000 0.0663
Institutional Ownership 0.2645 0.8579 0.0000 1.4196
Source: Data processing
The dynamic estimation model used fixed-effect cross-section specifications shows in 
Table 2. Results show that the R-square is 80.71%, and the adjusted R-square is 79.37%. 
Predictive ability with this model looks better than other models. The normality test 
shows that the residuals normally distribute with the Jarque-Berra value of 285.66614 and 
probability value of 0.000. Residual heteroscedasticity does not occur, and residuals are 
homoscedasticity. The correlogram test shows no autocorrelation and partial correlation. 
The use of lag cash/total assets in the regression model shows the best result until the lag 
model 1. The prediction results of the firm’s cash determination show that variables market 
to book, sales growth, net working capital, capital expenditure, debt, dividends, previous 
year’s cash C_TA (-1) affect the firm’s cash. Variable size and LOGAGE or firm’s age does 
not significantly affect the firm’s cash.
Cash prediction results show that the market to book value will increase the firm’s cash 
amount by 0.16%. The testing result indicates a positive relationship between the market to 
book value and cash. It is consistent with the findings of Anderson & Hamadi (2016). Sales 
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growth will increase the firm’s cash amount by 2.9%. The variable sales growth prediction is 
consistent with the findings of Shipe (2015). Higher working capital will increase the firm’s 
cash amount.
Table 2. Summary of Prediction Model of Cash Holding in Indonesian Firms
Panel Cross-Section Fixed Dynamic Panel Least Square Dynamic Panel Fixed Effect
Variables Coefficient t-Stat. Coefficient t-Stat. Coefficient t.Stat.
Constanta 0,0469*** 3,6308 0,0000 0,0069 0,0217*** 1,9048
MTB 0,0043*** 4,7047 0,0071*** 8,0357 0,0019** 2,3234
Sales -0,0001 -0,756 0,0073** 1,9105 0,0029** 1,9217
Size 0,0034 1,5225 -0,000 -0,554 0,0003 0,1233
NWC_TA 0,0938*** 18,097 0,0314*** 8,3085 0,0623*** 13,190
CE_TA -0,0018 -0,192 0,0950*** 5,2151 0,0271*** 3,2815
Debt_TA -0,0132*** -4,446 -0,018*** -3,424 -0,006** -2,426
DIV 0,0100*** 6,3687 0,0131*** 5,0035 0,0062*** 4,5481
LOGAGE -0,0187*** -5,803 0,0165*** 2,9814 0,0023 0,7244
C_TA(-1) - - - 53,355 0,3753*** 27,186
R-square 0,7238 0,5830 0,8071
Adjusted R2 0,7059 0,6635 0,7937
F-statistic 40,397 0,5818 60,146
Prob 
(F-stat.)
0000 0000 0000
DW-Stats. 1,2793 2,2299 2,1296
N 3349 3152 3152
Source: Summarized from Eviews Result 2018
Note *=significant at the level of 10%, ** = significant at 5%, *** = significant at 1%.
The net working capital variable affects the firm’s cash is also consistent with the finding 
by Venkiteshwaran (2011), Orlova & Rao (2018). Increased capital expenditure will also 
increase the firm’s cash amount to 2.71% of the firm’s total assets. The positive relationship of 
capital expenditure with firm cash is consistent with the findings of Venkiteshwaran (2011), 
and Orlova & Rao (2018). Larger firm’s debt will reduce the firm’s cash amount by 0.63% of 
total assets. Negative debt relation with cash is consistent with the findings of Shipe (2015), 
Orlova & Rao (2018). The higher dividend will increase the firm’s cash amount. The positive 
relationship between dividends and cash is consistent with Venkiteshwaran (2011). The 
coefficient of cash/total assets (-1) indicates that higher cash in the previous year will increase 
the firm’s cash.
In this analysis, using trade-off theory, agency theory, corporate governance of cash, 
the optimal level of cash holdings for firms is dynamic rather than static. The results of 
the proposed hypothesis testing show in Table 3. The results show that cash, cash holding, 
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optimal cash holding, cash holding speed of adjustment have a positive effect on Tobin’s 
Q. The testing with a variety of different proxies shows the same results, namely cash/ total 
assets, cash holding, cash holding speed of adjustments positively are related to Tobin’s Q. 
These results indicate that the higher the cash value, cash holding, optimal cash holding, and 
cash holding speed of adjustment and the firm will increase the firm value.
Table 3. Moderated Regression Result
Tobin’s Q
Independent Variables Coef. t-Stat F-statistic
Cash/Total Asset
Optimal Cash
Speed.Adj
Insider Ownership
Insider Ownership * Cash/Total Asset
Insider Ownership * Optimal Cash
Insider Ownership * Speed.Adj
Institutional Ownership
Institutional Ownership * Cash/Total Asset
Institutional Ownership * Optimal Cash
Institutional Ownership * Speed.Adj
Independent Board
Independent Board * Cash/Total Asset
Independent Board * Optimal Cash
Independent Board * Speed.Adj
0,6277
2,8450
0,0035
-0,035
-0,997
0,009
-0,004
-0,000
0,476
-0,014
-0,000
-0,023
0,886
6,016
-0,003
8,412***
6,932***
2,507**
-0,346
-1,848*
7,9046***
-0,251
-0,211
2,814***
-0,060
-0,133
-0,774
2,371**
3,285***
-0,278
34,19
44,37
38,76
32,89
32,77
33,67
32,81
36,23
33,67
43,91
38,31
33,19
33,68
43,92
38,34
Note. *10%, **5%, *** 1%.
Source: Data processing
Cash decisions and optimal cash holding are the decision that must be made by the 
manager in maintaining the capability of the firm’s liquidity and operational liquidity. Many 
firms are significantly different in optimal cash and cash level, which are affected by many 
factors. The cash holding policy is related to the efficiency of firm management because it 
affects the firm’s daily operations, investment, financial behavior, dividend payment, and 
other activities. The optimal level of cash is not the same across firms or over time (Chang 
et al., 2016; Shipe, 2015; Anderson & Hamadi, 2016; Lozano & Duran, 2016). Firms 
continuously need to adjust their cash levels to achieve the level of cash that balances the 
benefits and costs of liquidity.
Firms should allocate the firm’s holding cash at the optimal level, where at the optimal 
level, cash holding is used to maximize shareholder welfare. Either way, they should not 
only maximize the welfare of the managers or management or controlling shareholders. The 
test results indicate that the faster the firm adjusts to optimal cash, the more increasing the 
firm value will be. The result of this research supports several previous studies, such as those 
from (Orlova & Rao, 2018; Lozano & Duran, 2016; Shipe, 2015). The benefits of the cash 
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holding speed of adjustment to the optimal target level include suppressing over investment, 
maintaining cash reserves, and serving as substantial economic condition smoothing. These 
are the indication of proper cash management (Orlova & Rao, 2018; Shipe, 2015). Chang 
et al. (2016), Lozano & Duran, (2016) found that the cash holding speed of adjustment 
would reduce transaction costs, a trade-off between costs and benefits that would increase the 
value of the firm. The research from Shipe (2015), Lozano & Duran (2016) found the results 
of speed of adjustment as measured by the cash volatility cash holding, thus indicating an 
increase in firm value measured by Tobin’s Q.
We find characteristics of insider ownership firms that influence their cash holding 
policy, and we posit that insider ownership firms have various cash policy. Thus we analyze the 
indirect effects of being an insider ownership firm on cash holding by including moderating 
variables in our models. The results show that the higher the insider ownership of the firm, 
the weaker the relationship between cash holding and firm value. This result indicates that 
insider ownership strengthens the relationship between optimal cash holding and firm value. 
Meanwhile, insider ownership does not moderate the relationship of cash holding speed of 
adjustments to firm value.
The results of insider ownership testing reinforce the relationship between optimal 
cash holding and firm value. Results indicate that insider ownership accurately controls 
cash management because the average insider ownership is low and therefore minimizing 
the indulgence of personal interests. These results are consistent with findings by Lozano & 
Duran (2016), who found significant interacts and relationship between insider ownership 
and firm performance. The findings of the insider ownership reinforce the relationship 
between optimal cash holding and firm value. It is consistent with the finding by Anderson 
& Hamadi (2016) that there is an indication that dispersed insider ownership will minimize 
managers using excess cash holding. Referring to the theories and empirical evidence, the 
effect of insider ownership can be increasing the firm value is consistent with the efficient 
monitoring hypothesis or convergence of interest hypothesis (Jensen & Meckling, 1976; 
Lozano & Duran, 2016).
The results show that insider ownership of a firm does not interact with the cash 
holding speed of adjustments and firm value. There is a tendency that insider ownership 
neither pays close attention nor controls the speed of adjusting to optimal cash. This research 
indicates that firm in Indonesia look at the family business, and cash can be transferred easy 
between firms or group business. It is consistent with the finding by Shipe (2015). There are 
indications that managers pay more attention to optimal cash for operational liquidity and a 
firm’s liquidity. 
The testing results of the institutional ownership have more interaction effect between 
cash and firm value. This result indicates that more substantial institutional ownership 
reinforces the relationship between cash and the firm value. The institutional ownership 
can control the cash management to managers for conducting good corporate governance 
and increasing corporate value. The results also show that institutional ownership does 
not moderate the relationship between optimal cash holding and firm value. There is an 
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indication that institutional ownership is unwilling or reluctant to exercise optimal cash 
management control, and there is a tendency only to control the firm’s cash. Institutional 
ownership has more trust in the managerial capabilities of the firm, thus controlling the 
firm’s cash management to become very weak (Graves & Waddock, 1990; Lozano & Duran, 
2016). This result is consistent with the finding by Da Cruz (2015). Meanwhile, institutional 
ownership tends to be only short-lived and more concerned with the firm’s stock price on the 
market and will retrieve it during the high-price season. 
Institutional ownership does not moderate the relationship between cash holding speed 
of adjustments and firm value. There is an indication that institutional ownership is reluctant 
to over profoundly control the firm’s optimal cash management. Optimal cash management 
is the responsibility of financial managers. Institutional ownership trusts the managerial 
capabilities of the firm, turning the control of the firm’s optimal cash management very weak. 
Institutional ownership tends to be associated with low performance. Institutional ownership 
is often involved in various business groups for those legally separated from the firm, either 
formally or informally (Da Cruz, 2015). Institutional investors are different from individual 
investors who do not interfere in the internal affairs of firms with shares. Insignificant results 
of an institutional framework with weak investor protection lead us to consider the need to 
carry out more in-depth analyses in future research. To observe whether this institutional 
effect remains over a more extended period (Lozano & Duran, 2016).
The enormous independent board, it will make a stronger interaction effect between 
cash, optimal cash, and firm value. This result is consistent with Lozano & Duran (2016), 
and Anderson & Hamadi (2016). Research by Black et al. (2006) found that there was a 
positive role between the independent board, board of commissioners, and firm performance. 
The board of commissioners plays a vital role in countries with weak investor protection and 
emerging markets (Claessens & Yurtoglu, 2012; Chang et al., 2016). Through the optimal 
supervision, independent commissioners can reduce excessive risk-taking and moral hazard 
behavior, taken by the non-independent commissioners. The study conducted by Coles et al. 
(2001) found that the higher the representation of independent commissioners would improve 
the function of strategic control from the commissioner. Through close supervision, the 
independent commissioners can reduce the excessive risk of the behavior of the commissioners. 
The independent board is expected to be able to carry out the responsibility to monitor the 
management team to work effectively in order to increase shareholder prosperity (Shipe, 2015). 
The independent board does not moderate the relationship between cash holding 
speed of adjustment and firm value. The argument that can derive from these findings is the 
tendency of the independent board to pay more attention, control the firm’s optimal cash 
position compared to the speed of the firm in adjusting cash to cash. These findings are in 
line with those by Hermalin & Weisbach (2003) stated that independent commissioners 
would generate information asymmetry; whereas firm managers have excessive information 
compared to the board of commissioners. The board of commissioners has limited information 
about firm operations and irrelevant skills trends. Such conditions will have an impact on the 
reluctance of the board of commissioners, making them uncritical and inactive in exercising 
control according to the role and task of monitoring. 
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Table 4. The Robustness Checks Estimation Cash Holding
Dependent variable: Cash/Total Asset F-stat R2 Adj R2 Sign
Panel CSF 40.397 0.72 0.70 ***
Dynamic Panel LS 488.12 0.58 0.58 ***
Dynamic Panel Fixed Effect 60.146 0.80 0.79 ***
Note: *10%, ** 5%, *** 1%.
The estimator of dynamic panel data has two essential advantages: controlling for potential 
endogeneity problems and addressing the dynamic nature of cash holding (Chang et al., 2015; 
Lozano & Duran, 2016). The test support used the dynamic panel for estimates of optimal cash 
holding. The cash holding speed of adjustment, deviation standard of cash is relevant to estimates 
cash management in Indonesian the firm. The robustness test shows in Table 4 and Table 5.
Table 5. Robustness Checks Cash Management and Firm Value
Dependent Variable: Tobin’s Q F-stat R2 Sign
Cash/Total Asset 34.19 0.68 ***
Optimal cash holding (estimation) 44.38 0.73 ***
Standard Partial Speed of Adjustment 38.77 0.71 ***
Cashi,t+1 - Cashi,t = β(Cash*I,t+1 - Cashi,t) + e
Standard Deviasi Target Cash 37.66 0.70 ***
SDTC, Cashi = Cashi,t0/Asseti,t-1 - Cashi,t0/Asseti,t0
Note: *10%, ** 5%, ***1%.
Conclusion
There is still a limited amount of research in Indonesia about optimal cash and the 
optimal speed of adjustment that uses the incorporation of agency theory and corporate 
governance. The results show that cash, cash holding, cash, cash holding speed of adjustment 
are positively related to firm value. These findings make optimal cash management guidance 
and the speed of adjusting to optimal cash in increasing firm value. Greater insider ownership 
further strengthens the relationship between optimal cash holding and firm value. The present 
research shows that the interaction of corporate governance also demonstrates mixed results. 
Insider ownership can manage cash and optimal cash to increase firm value. The independent 
board is capable of monitoring cash and optimal cash. Corporate governance does not interact 
with the effect between cash holding speed of adjustment and firm value. These results give 
a clue to the weaknesses of corporate governance about monitor and control cash holding 
speed of adjustment in Indonesia firms.
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